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AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW:
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LA W
ROBERT

L.

FELIX*

The happy occasion for this essay is the recent publication
of the third edition of Robert Leflar's treatise on the conflict of
laws.' Professor Leflar has been busy not only in the preparation
of the several editions of this treatise, but in other areas of legal
writing, as well. Most of us know of his work in conflicts, but in
surveying Professor Leflar's work from about the time of the last
edition of the treatise, in 1968, to the present, I was very interested to see the other areas in which he has written: criminal law
and taxation with particular emphasis on conflicts, torts, legal
education, and one of his favorite areas, his work with state appellate judges. My own purpose here is to make some comments
on the treatise and to suggest a few directions that the conflicts
area seems to be taking; in sum, to propose an idea or two toward
a next edition of American Conflicts Law.
Professor Leflar's original intention was to produce a set of
Arkansas annotations to the first Restatement of Conflict of
Laws.2 As the work progressed, his intentions changed and he
chose instead the format of a single volume treatise on the law of
conflict of laws of a single state.3 As Leflar himself put it,
[i]n the middle thirties I started out to prepare Arkansas
annotations for the Conflict of Laws Restatement, but after abstracting all the cases I realized that a listing of cases "contra"
and in "accord" with the sections of the Restatement, however
fully explained by further notes, would give an inaccurate picture of the state's law. Instead, a short treatise was written on
Arkansas law.4
When the time came to produce a further version of his study
of conflict of laws, Professor Leflar broadened the enterprise to
reflect the fact that no single state can contain within its law the
entire subject of conflict of laws. One must also surmise that the
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; A.B., LL.B., University of Cincinnati; M.A., University of British Columbia; LL.M., Harvard University.
1. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAw (3d ed. 1977).
2. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLIar OF LAWS (1934).
3. R. LEFLAR, THE ARKANSAS LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1938).
4. Preface to R. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAws at v (1959).
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lure of a national format was irresistable to a comprehensive
scholar wishing to present new slants on conflicts problems. In
1959 Leflar put the work out in the form of a general treatise and
thus launched the book as we know it today.- Although the law
of Arkansas remained a special feature of the treatise, that feature was subordinated to a national format.'
In 1959 most states still adhered to the Bealian systematics
of the first Restatement,7 and for one seeking to present contemporary case law, that was a fact of life. Drawing on experience as
a teacher and as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Arkansas,
Leflar preferred to explain the law as he found it rather than
substitute developing law-school jurisprudence for judicial doctrine. While this may have frustrated some reviewers, 8 others
perceived that an explanation of the law as found would be more
useful to bench and bar as an exposition of the subject, and would
also provide a basis for understanding the reasons that motivate
decisionmaking and that accompany change One review put the
matter neatly:
Leflar's analytical approach is not a dry conceptualism; he is
very practical and he never loses sight of policy. But it is with
established techniques and analysis that the policy objectives
are to be achieved. This conforms to the nature of the judicial
process and the development of the law. Leflar's approach is the
one which can best be understood and which will likely be followed by students and lawyers and judges."'
5.Id.
6. [I]n this new book all the Arkansas cases up to January 1, 1959, are dealt
with, but they are treated as part of an American law of Conflict of Laws, and
the effort of the work is to give a fair picture of the American Law as it typically
operates in any one of the states today.
Id.
7. Beale's enormous influence upon conflicts jurisprudence is not always easy for
today's students of the subject to appreciate. His three-volume treatise, J. BEALE, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935), and his forceful management as reporter of the first Restatement, represent the high-water mark of the territorial vested-rights theory of the law of
conflict of laws. The paradox, however, is obvious, for the revolution was already in the
making. The "local law" theory that is at the heart of modem choice-of-law thinking was
already in motion. See 3 ALI PROCEEDINGS 222-81 (1925); W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTIcLES ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1947). The proceedings clearly reveal opposition by Cook, Lorenzen, and others

to the Bealian jurisprudence.
8. See, e.g., Paulson, Book Review, 12 STAN. L. REv. 707 (1960); Weintraub, Book
Review, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 611 (1960).

9. Dainow, Book Review, 14 ARK. L. REv. 183 (1960); Shuman, Book Review, 35
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1105 (1960).
10. Dainow, supra note 9, at 186.
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By the time the second edition came out in 1968," much had
changed, particularly in the area of choice of law. To reflect
change in the subject, Professor Leflar abandoned the traditional
term "conflict of laws" and adopted the vernacular "conflicts."
As Leflar put it: "The new title is intended to be characteristic
of the book, representing a mild break with the past, a recognition
that the law requires both new language and new analysis if it is
to be described, or explained, in realistic fashion."'" A brief survey of developments in the subject in the years between the two
editions is in order.
As Leflar points out, the promulgation and use of long-arm
statutes extending state-court jurisdiction in a manner consistent
with the due process clause of the federal constitution became
routine.' 3 Although he expressed continuing concern over the uncertainty regarding the ultimate reach of state-court jurisdiction,
it was in choice of law that change was most evident. A catalogue
of a few of the developments illustrates the point.
In 1959 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in a case involving
interspousal immunity," abandoned the traditional rule of lex
loci delicti for torts and adopted a rule of lex domicilii. In 1961
the New York Court of Appeals struggled to avoid the application
of the Massachusetts limitation on damages for wrongful death
by characterizing the issue as procedural, thus enabling the court
to apply its own rule, implementing the forum's policy of full
compensation.'" Two years later, the court of appeals adopted a
more suitable method for choice of law in torts in the landmark
case of Babcock v. Jackson.'" Commenting on the New York
promulgation of a "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts"
approach for choice of law in tort cases, Professor Leflar stressed
the need to identify the real reasons for such decisions, including forum preference.'" He praised the flexibility indicated in
Babcock and looked forward to the development of a practical
approach to meet changing policies and changing fact patterns.
11. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw (2d ed. 1968).
12. Preface to id. at v.
13. Id.
14. Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
15. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961). The procedural characterization of the wrongful-death danajes was soon
abandoned in Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 17, 183 N.Y.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
16. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
17. Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1247 (1963).
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(The denouement in New York is discussed by Professor Rosenberg in this symposium, and the exchange of views between him
and Professor Leflar will give the reader a chance to decide for
himself what directions ought to be taken in the choice-of-law
process.)
In Bernkrant v. Fowler,1 a contracts case decided by the
Supreme Court of California in 1961, Chief Justice Traynor discussed the "governmental interests theory," which he later applied in a 1967 wrongful-death case, Reich v. Purcell.19 In calling
Reich v. Purcell "a wise and useful decision," Leflar observed
that the propriety of the result would have been even plainer if
all the relevant choice-influencing considerations had been taken
into account.2 " Explaining the application of choice-influencing
considerations to the law-fact patterns of decided cases was a
technique Professor Leflar had previously used in two law review
articles in which he sought to refine the identification and utilization of the real reasons for choice-of-law decisions.2
In the first of the two articles, Professor Leflar asserts that
"[tihe major considerations that should influence choice of law
have always been present and operative in the cases.

22

Leflar's

preference for evolutionary analysis is evident from his candid
accounting of the prior scholarly assessment of the factors that
underlie choice-of-law decisions. Particular attention is drawn to
the enumeration of policy factors by Cheatham and Reese.2 Professor Leflar also acknowledges the works of Yntema and Cavers
as important to the formation of his methodology.24 In the first
article, Leflar arrived at a synthesis of "the considerations that
have, expressly or impliedly, always underlain common-law
choice-of-law decisions . . .: A. Predictability of results; B.

Maintenance of interstate and international order; C. Simplifica18.

55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
19. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
20. Leflar, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 551, 637 (1968).
21. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267

(1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 CALIF. L.
Rcv. 1584 (1966).
22. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv.
267, 267 (1966).

23. Id. at 279 (discussing Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1952)). See also Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 682 (Spring 1963).
24. Leflar, supra note 22, at 280-82 (discussing D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW
PRocEss 139-203 (1965) and Yntema, The Objectives of PrivateInternationalLaw, 35 CAN.

BAR REV. 721, 735-36 (1957)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/5

4

19801

Felix: American
ConflictsON
Law:
American Conflicts Law
LEFLAR
CONFLICTS

tion of the judicial task; D. Advancement of the forum's governmental interests; E. Application of the better rule of law."2s
Had the general applicability of Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations remained merely an academic exercise, one could
still have praised the insight and clarity of expression that mark
the chapter on choice-influencing considerations that is the heart
of the 1968 edition of the treatise. Much added dimension, how-

ever, is given to these considerations by the imprimatur of Judge
Kenison's 1966 opinion in Clark v. Clark.2" This first judicial
adoption of the Leflar methodology led other states to do likewise,
either as the exclusive basis of rationalization or in combination
with other modem methodologiesY
In the nine-year interval between the second and third editions, change in the choice-of-law process has been less spectacular. Professor Leflar has observed that the change, though statistically impressive,2 has been for the most part a matter of following a few leading cases adopting new methodologies and
blending those methodologies into an eclectic pattern. 91 Thus,
the latest edition of the treatise reflects this assessment. The
general chapters on choice of law are titled "Choice-of-Law
Theories" and "The Combination of Modem Approaches." The
former chapter contains a section on choice-influencing considerations and the latter a series of sections explicating and correlating them.
Again, Professor Leflar has kept pace with his subject." The
result is a comprehensive, authoritative, and judicious compilation and analysis of authority in American conflicts law. The care
25. Leflar, supra note 22, at 282.
26. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
27. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Mitchell v. Craft, 211
So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967). For an
account of subsequent adoptions and a discussion of the interplay of modem choice-oflaw methodologies and eclecticism in contemporary case law, see Leflar, Choice of Law:

A Well-Watered Plateau, LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 10,(Spring 1977).
28. More than half of the states have abandoned the traditional choice-of-law

method, especially in tort and contract cases, and have embarked on some version of the
several modem approaches. Professor Leflar's home state of Arkansas has recently undertaken a blend of his and other choice-of-law methodologies in Williams v. Carr, 263 Ark.
326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978) and Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d
453 (1977). The cases are sternly criticized in Hogue, Arkansas' New Choice-of-Law Rule

for Torts: A Critique of Wallis, Williams, and the "Better Rule of Law," 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q. 713.
29. Leflar, supranote 27, at 10.
30. This has been a consistent feature of Leflar's work. See Felix, Book Review, 34
Mo. L. REV. 304 (1969).
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with which the author distinguishes the presentation of authority
and the presentation of his own approach makes the book of great
value to academic and professional students of the subject. In
discussing the second edition, the late Professor Ehrenzweig referred to Leflar's work as the best American treatise, pointing
particularly to its accomplishments in dealing with jurisdiction
and the conflict of laws in the area of criminal law and taxation.3'
He noted, however, that the work needed to be beefed up on
history and theory. While Professor Ehrenzweig might not have
agreed entirely that his advice has been followed, it is apparent
that the evolution of the theories of American conflicts law is
admirably presented in the present edition.
After the third edition had gone to the printer and had been
proofread, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.32 This case has been the subject of
extensive law review commentary, 33 and was the topic for the
Conflicts Section roundtable at the December 1977 meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools.3 Shaffer extended the
due process requirement of "fair play and substantial justice" an-35
nounced by the Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington
for in personam jurisdiction to apply to in rem and quasi in rem
judicial jurisdiction. 6 More particularly, Shaffer held that the
sequestration of stock in a Delaware corporation owned by a nonresident director violated the due process clause when the pur-3
ported seizure was unrelated to the underlying causes of action.
Leflar had anticipated both the extension of the International
Shoe formula and the application of it to disestablish Harris v.
Balk'" and its progeny. He earlier called our attention to the
"persistent doubt" about jurisdiction by foreign attachment or
garnishment and built upon the Third Circuit's invalidation of a
somewhat comparable Delaware garnishment.39 Of further inter31. Ehrenzweig, Book Review, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 619 (1968).
32. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
33. For a collection of citations to discussions of Shaffer v. Heitner and for Professor
Leflar's further thoughts on the case, see Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY
AM. L. 1, 2-7.
34. For a published version, see Symposium: State Court JurisdictionAfter Shaffer
v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REv. 991 (1978).
35. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
36. 433 U.S. at 207.
37. Id. at 215-17.
38. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The abandonment of Harrisv. Balk is indicated in Shaffer.
433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
39. United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
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est, especially here in the presence of Professor Rosenberg from
New York and Justice Todd from Minnesota, are the post-Shaffer
expressions by those two states indicating continued use of the
attachment of contingent claims of nonresident defendants
against their liability insurance carriers.
It will be remembered that in Seider v. Roth" the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the attachment by a New York plaintiff
of the obligation of an insurer subject to in personam jurisdiction
in New York to indemnify and defend its nonresident insured in
the matter of an out-of-state automobile accident. Professor
Leflar's assessment of the impact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the
Seider procedure is unequivocal: "Now that Heitner has done
away with Harris v. Balk, it should follow that Seider v. Roth
and its progeny are unconstitutional also." 41 He stresses the
practical unfairness of Seider from the viewpoint of both the
garnishee insurance company and the nonresident defendant.
In spite of the pre-Shaffer constitutional hedging about Seider
by the Second Circuit in Minichiello v. Rosenberg," Leflar sees
continuing constitutional problems in Seider regarding both
judicial and legislative jurisdiction. Taken literally as a garnishment of the property of a nonresident defendant, the Seider
process is even more objectionable than the simple seizure of a
conceded debt in Harrisv. Balk. If Harrisfalls in light of Shaffer,
so must Seider. Taken as the judicial equivalent of a direct-action
statute, Seider raises a choice-of-law problem. There is no directaction statute available. As Leflar points out:
in the New York garnishment cases there were no direct action
statutes in the states where the accidents happened, nor in any
other state that had substantial contact with the facts. If there
were a New York direct action rule, it could not be substantively
applied since New York's only connection with the facts was
U.S. 908 (1977). See R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 24.
40. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
41. R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 25.
42. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). In Minichiello,
Judge Friendly bases the constitutionality of the Seiderprocess on use by a forum resident
and on the nonresident's limited appearance and immunity from any unfavorable judgment being given collateral estoppel effect beyond the limits of the policy attached. 410
F.2d at 111-12. In so doing, Judge Friendly may have overread the functional assertion
that the Seider process operates as a judicial equivalent of a direct-action statute and may
have interpreted too broadly the constitutional permissibility of direct-action statutes
expressed in Watson v. Employee Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). Watson dealt
with an accident within the forum state, not merely with a plaintiff forum resident.
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that the plaintiff is a New York resident, which is probably not
enough to satisfy the constitutional due process of law requirement for legislative jurisdiction. It was New York's procedure,
and only New York's, that created the semblance of a direct
action statute, when in fact none existed. The failure of the
direct action analogy results not from any inherent unfairness
in trying the transitory action in New York, but rather from a
constitutionally impermissible choice of substantively governing law.43
In spite of such analysis, courts continue to be seduced by the
lure of Seider v. Roth, as is illustrated by post-Shaffer adherence
to the Seiderprocedure by the Second Circuit in O'Connorv. LeeHy Paving Corp." and by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
Savchuk v. Rush.45 In O'Connorthere may have been factors that
made attachment by a New York forum less constitutionally
objectionable than in Seider itself. Even so, the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court was not without dissent
arguing for at least a full consideration of the constitutional issues.4" It is not surprising that Savchuk has had an even closer
brush with the Supreme Court. The first Minnesota decision was
vacated and remanded for consideration in the light of the
Shaffer 7 decision. Undaunted, the Minnesota court again
affirmed Savchuk and another appeal was attempted. Now that
probable jurisdiction has been noted,48 Professor Leflar and
those who agree with him may be vindicated. Plainly, the Minnesota contacts in Savchuk are slight.49 The post-accident
acquisition of residence in Minnesota seems only barely to
satisfy the Minichiello restriction of Seider to use by forum residents. Further, choice-of-law consequences, disadvantageous
to the forum resident plaintiff if the action is brought elsewhere,
43. R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 25 (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930))
(other footnotes omitted).
44. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978) (work-related wrongful
death in Virginia involving a New York contract of employment).
45. 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated and remanded in light of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), aff'd on rehearing, Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888
(Minn. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 99 S. Ct. 1211 (1979), oral argument heard, Rush v.
Savchuk, 48 U.S.L.W. 3238 (Oct. 9, 1979).
46. 99 S. Ct. at 639 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
47. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
48. 99 S. Ct. 1211 (1979).
49. At the time of the single-car accident in Indiana, both the plaintiff and the
defendant driver were residents of Indiana. Later in the same year, plaintiff moved with
his parents to Minnesota and became a resident of the forum state. 272 N.W.2d at 889.
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do not indicate that no other forum is available." Undesirable
substantive choice-of-law consequences in another available
forum do not create minimum contacts in the plaintiff's home
forum.
Added impetus to the possibility of further constitutional
developments may be seen between the lines of the 1978 decision
by the United States Supreme Court in Kulko v. Superior
Court.51 The Court reversed a Supreme Court of California decision allowing jurisdiction over a nonresident New York father in
a case involving the divorced mother's claim for additional support for their children, whom the father had permitted to go to
California. The Court found that the father, in acquiescing in the
children's desire to spend more time in California than was provided in the separation agreement, had not purposefully availed
himself of the benefit and protection of the laws of California so
as to be constitutionally amenable to suit in California for increased child support.52 The Court also assessed the inconven-

iences to the nonresident father, who could not be deemed to
foresee defending in California, and balanced them against the
availability of a New York forum in an action involving an agreement that was executed in New York and that the Court assumed
53
would be governed by New York law. Interpretations of Kulko

will vary;" it is of interest here not so much for the correctness of
the decision on the facts but because the Court has chosen to
make yet another move into the area of policingstate-court jurisdiction. 5 Continuing attention to the unfolding doctrine of
50. The court seems persuaded, however, that such is the case: "A state's interest in
providing a forum for its residents is particularly strong where an alternative forum would
not have permitted recovery. In the instant case, Indiana's guest statute would have cut
off Savchuk's claim .

. .

. Ind. Stat. § 9-3-3-1. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 211,...."

272 N.W.2d at 891 n.5. The dissent argues that the court is misreading Shaffer. 272
N.W.2d at 894 (Otis. J., dissenting).
51. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
52. Id. at 94.
53. Id. at 97-101.
54. Commentary on Kulko has begun to appear and interpretations of the case,
though generally favorable, do show some inconsistencies. Compare Note, A New Minimum Contacts Analysis, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 905 (1979) with Note, The Long-Arm
Reach of the Courts Under the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. Rv.
175 (1979). See also Note, 1979 DEw. COL. L. L. REv. 159; Comment, 31 S.C.L. REv. 555
(1980); Comment, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 797. For a useful study that predates the United
States Supreme Court decision in Kulko, see Fischer, State Interest,Minimum Contacts,
and in Personam JurisdictionUnder Code of Civil ProcedureSection 410.10, 12 U.S.F.L.
REv. 387 (1978).
55. Trhe current possibility of a sweeping opinion in the area of state court jurisdiction
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International Shoe in McGee" and Hanson,"
59
succession in Shaffer" and Kulko, indicates a constitutional
exposition of the due process clause over a range of actions and
contact patterns. Such an exposition may entail development of
the positive as well as the negative implications of the due process
clause. This, in turn, may link more effectively the legislative as
well as the judicial authority of the states. It must be remembered, however, that the Court insists that the constitutional
justifications for choice of law are not to be translated into justification for the assumption of jurisdiction.
Professor Leflar has already argued that the states should
more closely police state-court jurisdiction in order to avoid unnecessary litigation on non-substantive issues." In the past, he
has pointed out, somewhat ruefully, that the due process threshold of tolerance regarding state-court jurisdiction is very high,
permitting assertions of jurisdiction that are "barely fair" and
prohibiting only those which are "grossly unjust."'" The classic
example is transient jurisdiction based on casual presence, in
actions unrelated to the forum. (It is perhaps wicked to point out
that one of the most celebrated examples of "ambush" jurisdiction is the Arkansas case of Grace v. MacArthur,2 in which a
defendant was served in an airplane flying over Professor Leflar's
home state!)
A narrowing of the opportunity for transient jurisdiction and
a growing constitutional emphasis on the selection of a convenient forum as a decisionmaking consideration 3 must, of course,
bring the issues of jurisdiction and choice of law into clearer
focus. " Neither authority nor principle, however, supports.a thorough equation of considerations that govern the two questions.
Professor Leflar, for example, suggests that if a state has the
is suggested by the fact that the Court heard arguments on the same day in Savchuk and
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978) (long-arm productsliability case).
56. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
57. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
58. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
59. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1978).
60. Leflar, Barely Fair,Not Grossly Unjust, 25 S.C.L. REV. 177 (1973).
61. See Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1969-70 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 1, 8. See also Cheatham, Conflicts of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 25 ARK. L. REv. 9, 25
(1971).
62. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
63. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 93-95.
64. Compare Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power
Myth" and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) with Traynor, Is This Conflict
Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657 (1959).
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authority to apply its substantive tort law to a controversy, it
reasonably follows that it has the authority to assert judicial jurisdiction. 5 He does not generalize this suggestion because choice
of law operates differently in other areas.
Domestic relations, moreover, is complicated by the question
of the continued vitality of domicile or its functional equivalent.
The recent South Carolina case of Nienow v. Nienow66 is in point.
The case appeared to be governed by Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,67
and in Nienow, the court did permit a recently divorced woman
to obtain alimony, but in so doing did not specify as a judicial
sine qua non that she had established domicile in South Carolina
prior to the rendition of a Florida ex parte divorce in favor of the
husband. The opinion implies a broadening of the basis for divisible divorce and post-divorce jurisdiction to determine claims for
support. A totality-of-contacts approach reminiscent of the opinion of Chief Justice Traynor in Atkinson v. Superior Court8
would also explain the decision. Of importance here is that when
something other than domicile acquired prior to a foreign ex parte
divorce becomes the articulated basis for jurisdiction, the choiceof-law options available to the forum increase.
As these and other issues unfold, Robert Leflar's work in
conflicts will continue to illuminate current authority and to suggest approaches for problems yet to come. His assessment of current theories and results is based on a sound appreciation of the
past, of the practical needs of the present, and of the directions
conflicts law will take in the future.
65. R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, §§ 55-62.

66. 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977), surveyed in 30 S.C.L. REv. 75 (1979).
67. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).

68. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1958).
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